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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
OLI~~~X .\HI> ~L

HOLLINS,

Plaintiff aud Appellant,
VS

Case No.

10168

11~ L 1 AN C E INSURANCE
CO~IP..:\NY~ a corporation,

THE H

DcfcJI(la nt and Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATI£,MENT OF KIND OF CASE
This purports to be an action in defamation against

The Reliance Insurance Company, which had brought an
action against its indemnitor (Hollins, plaintiff below),
to recover losses sustained by it (The Reliance Insurance
Company), a~ a result of writing an automobile dealer's
bond in cmnpliance with the Utah Motor ·vehicle Dealer's
Aet.

DISPOSITIOX IX LOWER COURT
On n10tion of defendant and respondent the complaint was disn1issed for failure to state a claim upon
which reli~:.•f could be granted.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and respondent seeks an affinnance of
the judgment below.
THE FACTS
This case is a companion to the case of The Reliance
Insurance Company vs. Glennard M. Hollins) No. 10087,
and grows out of the earlier case. However, the two
eases have not been consolidated on appeal, and The
Reliance Insurance Company (hereinafter called Reliance), is represented by separate counsel in each case.
The only facts· before the court in the instant case are
those contained in the plaintiff's complaint, which is
quite lengthy, and with its various attachments, runs to
21 pages. (R. 1-21). The essential facts, as set forth in
the plaintiff's complaint, in chronological order, are as
follows:
1. On the 14th day of June, 1964, plaintiff Hollins,
on behalf of Hollins, Inc., made application for a Motor
Vehicle Dealer's Bond as required by the Motor Vehicle
Dealer's Act of the State of Utah. (R. 1, 19). The application signed by Hollins contained the following language:
"The undersigned further agrees to reimburse and save harmless and indemnify the Company for, from, and against ariy and all loss,
damage or expense that it shall or may at any
time sustain, incur, or become liable for by reason of or on account of its having executed the
said bond or any extension, amendment, or re-
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3nPwal of ~aid bond, or a new bond as a continuation therPof or a substitute therefor or in
<'on.iunction then'with: also for, fr01n, and against
any and all costs and expenses that may be in('UI'l'Pd h)' the Company in investigating any
elaiin n1ade thereunder, or in or about prosecuting
or defending- any action, suit, or other proceeding~ that ma)' be commenced or prosecuted by or
against the undersigned, his or their heirs, exeentor~, administrators, successors, or assigns, or
againt the Company, upon the said bond or otherwise in relation thereto." (R. 19)
Pursuant to said application a bond was issued
hy defPndant July 6, 1954. (R. 1). Thereafter, the
GP1wral Credit Company filed an action against The
HdianeP Insurance Con1pany on the aforesaid bond,
(·laiming violations by the principal on the bond (Hollins,
Inc.), of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Dealer's
Art, and in particular, of failure on the part of the prineipal to deliver title certificates to two separate pureha~wrs of aut01nobiles. (R. 2). The file before this court
does not contain the c01nplaint or other pleadings in the
Ut>neral Credit ease. However, the judgment in that
ease (in favor of Reliance) is attached to the complaint
as an exhibit. (R. 11). The trial court specifically found
in that case that both of the sale transactions were made
by defendant's principal with full knowledge of the
General Credit Company; that General Credit C01npany
held in its possession the certificates of title to the automobiles and refused to deliver them to the purchasers,
although it had knowledge of, and had approved of the
proposed sales. (R. 12-13). The court further specifically
:2.
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found, "That as to the plaintiff, [The General Credit
Company] Glen Hollins, Inc., did not violate the provisions of Sec. 41-1-65, U.C.A. 1953, and as to the plaintiff
did not violate the provisions of Sec. 41-3-23 (d), U.C.A.
1953. (Emphasis Ours). (R. 13). The court also found
that defendant's principal had not delivered title certificates to the purchasers. (R. 13).
3. Thereafter, Reliance c o m m e n c e d an action
against Hollins, its indemnitor, to recover damages
which it had sustained in settling claims of the purchasers hereinbefore mentioned, (who were not parties
to the earlier action) and in defending the action commenced by The General Credit Company. (R. 14, et seq.).
The allegations of the complaint in that case are entirely
consistent with the findings of the court in the General
Credit Company case. In the case of Reliance vs. Hollins,
it was alleged in the complaint that Hollins was unable
to deliver title to the purchasers, and that by reason
thereof, Reliance became obliged to pay damages to the
purchasers of the automobiles, and incurred attorneys'
fees in defending said claims. While the complaint in
that case may have been technically defective in alleging
that Hollins individually could not make delivery rather
than that the corporation, Hollins, Inc., could not make
delivery, this was a technical defect only. Clearly Reliance was proceeding against Hollins on his indemnity
agreement above mentioned. Even though he was individually free of fault or breach of statutory duty, he was
contractually obligated to Reliance to hold it harmless.
(R. 14-15).
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4. 11 lw adion broug·ht by Reliance agai-nst Hollins
was diHmiss('d for reasons which do not clearly appear in
thP J'('('OI'd. rrhe judgment Of dismissal does not set
forth an~' rpa::-;on for the court's ruling, but merely re<·itP~ that thP matter was argued to the court and that
the court was fully advised in the premises. (R. 21).
rl. Following dismissal of the case brought by Reliance againHt Hollins, and after it had initiated appeal
prm·<·Pdings, Hollins cmn1nenced this action against RelimH'P apparently on the theory of defamation. (R. 1, et
~Pq.) TlwrP are many allegations in the complaint, the
offieP of which we do not understand. For example there
are many allegations suggesting that the attorneys who
rPpre~Pnted Reliance Insurance Company in the General
Credit Company case were also acting as personal attorIH.>ys for Hollins. There is at least some inference or
innuendo of breach of ethical conduct on their part. Hmvever, Hollins was not a party to the original action
brought by General Credit Company. He did, however,
cooperate with Reliance in the successful defense of that
aetion. It was very 1nuch to his advantage to do ,so,
since he would have been personally liable for any lo,ss
sustained by Reliance. However, the fact th~t. ;he, cooperated with the attorneys defending. Reliance .in .that
action did not create a relationship of ~ttorney and 9lient
between the attorneys and himself. On. the cont.rary, he
well knew that said attorneys were engaged by Reliance,
and were representing its interests.

6. Reliance attacked plaintiff's complaint by various n10tions, including a motion to dismiss for failure to
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (R. 2430). After oral argument, the motion to dismiss was
granted, and plaintiff's case was dismissed. (R. 32).
This appeal followed. (R. 31).
_Based upon statements of counsel for the appellant
in argument on the motion to dismiss in the lower court,
and upon the argument set forth in his brief before this
court, it appears that he considers this to he a case of
defamation, and we therefore address our argument to
that theory.
ARGUME·NT
It may be noted at the outset that plaintiff's claim is
based entirely upon the ruling of the court below in the
case of Reliance Insurance Company vs. Hollins. If this
court reverses that judgment, as we believe that it
should, it necessarily follows that the judgment in the
present action should be affirmed. However, even if it
is determined that the appeal in Case No. 10087 is without merit, we believe that the judgment below in the
instant case must be affirmed.
As we have pointed out in our Statement of Facts,
the allegations of the complaint in the case of Reliance
Insurance Company vs. Hollins are really not defamatory, even if they were not privileged. In that case the
plaintiff merely alleged a failure on the part of Hollins
to deliver ti•tle certificates to purchasers of automobiles
from Hollins, Inc. This is no more demafatory than an
allegation in a personal injury suit that defendant vio-
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latP<l a ~tat utP or ordinanrP for the control of autmnobile
l raffi<'. Tht~ eomplaint is at worst, only technically de-I'PdivP, in all(•ging that the failure was that of Hollins
IH'r~onnll~- ratlwr than his corporation. There is_ no questiPn, hoW\'YPr, that the title certificates were not delivPrt~d, and RelianeP, in good faith, claimed a loss by
rt·a~on of the execution of its bond as a result thereof.
JlowPn'r, even if the 1nistaken identification of Hollins
individually, as the party who precipitated t~e loss,
eould be ternwd dc'fan1atory under other circumstances,
n~ an allegation in the complaint it was absolutely
priviiPg\'d. The general rule of privilege as it pertains
to litigant~, is sd forth in Restatement of Torts, Sec.
:lSI. as follows:
".J [Htrty to a private litigation or a private
prosecutor or defendant in a criminal prosecution
is absol~ttely priviliged to publish false and defrunatory 1natter of another in communications
preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or
in the institution of or during the course and as a
part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has smne relation thereto."
(E1nphasis Ours.)

In Com1nent a thereunder, the rule is further expounded as follows:
.. The privilege stated in this Section is based
upon the public interest in according to all men
the utmost freedmn of access to the courts of justice for the settlement of their private disputes.
Like the privilege of an attorney, it is a.bsotute.
It protects a party to a private litigation or a
private prosecutor in a criminal prosecution from
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liability for defmnation irrespective of his purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, of his
belief in its truth or even his knowledge of its
falsity. * * *" (Emphasis Ours.)
And in Comment b thereunder, the reporter states
as follows:
"·The rule stated in this Section is applicable
to protect parties to any action before a judicial
tribunal. It is immaterial whether the action is
criminal or civil in character."
See also Comment d:
"The rule stated in this Section affords to a
party to litigation the same protection from liability for defamatory statements ma,de in his
pleadings as that accorded to an attorney under
the rule stated in ~ 586." (Emphasis Ours.)
The rule is the same with regard to attorneys. S.ee
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 586, and Comment a thereunder:
"An attorney at law is absolurtetly privileged
to publish false and defamatory matter of another
in communications prelin1inary to a proposed
judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or
during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it
has some relation thereto.

"a. ·The privilege stated in this section is
based upon a public policy of securing to attor·
neys as officers of the court the utmost freedom
in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.
Therefore the privilege is absolute. It protects
the attorney from liability in an action for defa-
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Illation irn·:-;pPdivP of his purpose in publishing
the dPfanwtor~· matter, his belief in its truth or
1'\'!'ll his knowledgP of its falsity. * * * The institution of a judicial proceeding includes all
Jdi'(Ul i llffs and affidavits necessary to set the
jndi<·ia I nmchinery in Inotion." (E1nphasis 01~rs.)
To thP :-;anH:' eff!•d see P ro0.scr on Torts, 2d Ed. Sec.
HG pap;P (itHi, et seq. :

"The defendant may be privileged to publish
defamation for the protection or furtherance of
a public or private interest recognized by the law
as entitled to such protection. Privileged utterances fall into two classes:
"a. Those absolutely immune from responsibility, without regard to the defendant's purpose
or motive, or the reasonableness of his conduct.
These include:
" ( 1) Judicial proceedings.

* * *
''Absolute i1nmunity has been confined to a
vpn· few situations where there is an obvious
poliey in favor of permitting compl~te freedom
of expression, without any inquiry_ as to the defendant's nwtives. By gener::tl agreement, it is
lilnited to the following situations:
··1. Judicial Proceedings. The judge on the
bench 1nust be free to administer the law under
the protection of the law; independently and freely, without fear of consequences. No such independence could exist if he were in d a i l y
apprehension of having an action brought against
hi1n, and his administration of justice submitted
to the opinion of a jury.

* .* •
·•For the smne reason, a similar absolute imInunity is conferred upon grand and petit jurors
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in the performance of their functions, upon witnesses, whether they testify voluntarily or not,
and upon counsel in the conduct of the case. Likewise, since there is an obvious public interest in
affording to everyone the utmost freedom of
access to the courts, the imm,unity extends to the
parties to private litigation, as well as to defendants and instigators of prosection in criminal
cases, as to anything that may be said in relation
to the matter at issue, whether it be in the pleadings, in affidavits, or in open court." (Emphasis
ours.)
See also 1 Harper & James on the Law of Torts,
Sec. 5.22:
" 'Neither party, witness, counsel, jury or
judge,' said Lord 11ansfield, 'can be put to answer
civilly or criminally for words spoken in offices.'"
(Emphasis ours.)
And further :
"Counsel, of course, are also protected by
the absolute privilege. Attorneys are officers of
the court, and as such, have an obligation to
society as well as to their clients. It is essential
that they be free to act on their best judgment,
without fear of answering in a civil action for defamation for anything said in the course of
judicial proceedings in which they participate.
The protection extends to· statements ma.de in
pleadings, affidavits or in open court." (Emphasis
ours.)
To the same effect also see 33 Ani. Jur., Libel and
Slander, 1964 Cumulative Suppleinent, page 22:
"The doctrine of absolute privilege is based
upon the principle of good public policy, in that
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thP int('l'P~t~ and necessities of society require
that on <'Prtain occasion utterances or publication~ of individuals, even though they are both
t'al~(' and malieiously made, shall protect the del'a tliPI' frmn all liability to prosection. * * *"
;\ good judicial discussion is found in Johnson vs .
•~·l'hlar/J, (\Vasl1.), 110 P.2d 190, where the c·ourt said:
"In detPrmining whether or not matter spoken
in thP conduct of an action or contained in the
pleadings is privileged, the test is not - is it
legally relevant~ But - Does it have. reference
and relation to the subject matter .of the action~
\Ve quote from S.acks v. Stecker, 60 F.2d 73, 75,
decided by the Federal Second Circuit Court of
.\ ppeals in 19·32: 'By an almost unbroken. line· of
authority in this country and Engfand, a party
lf'ho files a pleading or affidavit in a judicial proceeding has absolute immunity, though his statements are defamatory. and malicious, if they
relate to the subject of inquiry. *. * *" (Emphasis
ours.)
The court then went on to quote the Mansfield quotation which we have quoted from Harper.& James, an:d
the Ht>statmnent rules above quoted.
The foregoing rules have been codified in this state,
and haYl' received judicial recognition by ths court. Sec.
-1-5-:2-3, U. C.~-\. 1953, provides, insofar _as 1naterial hen~,
a:3 follows:
•· 'A privileged publication which shall not be
considered as libelous per se, is one made :

* * *
.. (2) In any publication of or any statement
1nade in any legislative or judicial proceeding, or
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in any other official proceeding authorized by
law."
In the recent case of Carter v. Jackson, 10 Ut. 2d,
284, 351 P.2d 957, this court said:
"There are two classes of privileged communications, absolute and qualified or conditional. In the case of absolutely privileged
communications the utterance or publication, although both false and malicious, does not give
rise to a cause of action. * * *
, "Subsections (1) and (2) of 45-2-3, U.C.A.
1953, define the communications that are absolutely privileged. * * *" (Emphasis ours.)
See also the earlier case of Williams vs. Standard
Examiner Pub. Co., et al., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1, where
this court said :
"In the case of absolutely privileged communications the utterances or publication, although both false and malicious, does not give
rise to a cause of action."
CONCLUSION
The allegations of the complaint in The Reliance Insurance Company v. Hollins, are not defamatory and
therefore are not actionable. Even if said allegations
were otherwise defamatory they are absolutely privileged under both the statute and decisional law of this
state. The judgment of dismissal should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN .AND JENSEN
By R.A Y R. CHRIS'TENSEN
1205 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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